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Crisis and Recovery in the Pearl River Delta.
Growth and Employment in the Electronics Industry
Stefan Ohm and Ingo Liefner
Krise und Erholung im Perlflussdelta.
Wachstum und Beschäftigung in der Elektronikindustrie
Compared with most other regions and industries in China, the electronics industry in the Pearl
River Delta (PRD) has been hit hard by the crisis of 2008 and 2009. Numerous companies have
ceased operations and thousands of workers have been laid off. The orientation of the electronics
industry towards exporting low-cost products has proven to be a point of weakness in this ongoing
crisis. The aims of this article are threefold: firstly, to highlight the key reasons for the crisis and
the Pearl River Delta’s susceptibility to it; secondly, to analyse the channels through which the
global crisis affected the PRD, and thirdly, to analyse the immediate effects on companies. All
analyses are based on firm-level data acquired in 2009 with support from DFG SPP 1233. They
show that the crisis has mainly affected the internationally oriented companies in the PRD.
With 2 Figures and 6 Tables
 1. Introduction
Ten years after the Asian crisis of 1997, the
global financial crisis of 2008 (or financial
tsunami, as it is called in East Asia) once again
placed emerging economies in East Asia under
severe pressure. In contrast to 1997, when the
Chinese economy was not as integrated into the
world market as it is today, China has been heav-
ily hit by the economic pressure created by the
recent crisis. In 2009 China’s overall exports
declined by more than 40 per cent. Important
economic regions with a strong focus on exports
suffered, and as a consequence, thousands of
companies closed their businesses and millions
of migrant workers lost their jobs. Due to their
dependence on foreign trade with manufactured
goods and foreign investments, the Pearl River
Delta (PRD) and the Yangtze River Delta (YRD)
were hit hardest by the effects of the financial
crisis in the last quarter of 2008 (Yu and Huang
2009: 7). The PRD is the economic powerhouse
of southern China and generated 79.4 per cent
of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the
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Guangdong province in 2008. The PRD is also
responsible for 95.9 per cent of all exports and
for 96.7 per cent of all imports for the province
(Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2009). The
most important industry in the PRD is the elec-
tronics sector which accounts for more than
60 per cent of total manufacturing (Guangdong
Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2009).
As Cai and Chan (2009: 513) point out, it is easy
to define the exact starting point of the financial
crisis in North America with the bankruptcy of
Lehman Brothers on September 15th 2008; it is
rather difficult, however, to define the exact date
on which the waves of the financial tsunami
reached the shores of the economy in the PRD.
The economic data of the Guangdong Provincial
Bureau of Statistics (2009) show that economic
growth rates in Guangdong started to slow down
in October 2008 and turned negative in Novem-
ber and December 2008. As demand for con-
sumer goods in North America, Europe and Japan
declined sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008, the
impact on the economy in the export-oriented
industries in the PRD was severe. The Chinese
government responded immediately with a mas-
sive financial stimulus package to prevent the
domestic economy from taking the same road
towards an economic decline as the U.S. and
Europe. The overall value of the economic stimu-
lus was $ 586 billion, financed by the enormous
fiscal resources of the Chinese state and several
provinces (Spence 2009: 508, Sun 2009: 35). The
aim of this financial stimulus was to maintain eco-
nomic growth of at least 8 per cent for 2009 and
to minimise the negative effects of the crisis. The
main share of the financial stimulus package went
into works designated for infrastructure projects,
such as road and rail improvements and direct sup-
port for export-orientated sectors which faced
major financial problems due to the decline in
international trade. As the National Bureau of Sta-
tistics of China (2010) reports, GDP growth in
2009 for China was 8.7 per cent, with a
10.7 per cent rise in the fourth quarter of 2009
compared to the same quarter in 2008. Despite
the massive economic pressure, the Chinese
economy resisted the international trend of eco-
nomic decline, but growth rates in 2009 were
much lower than they were projected in 2008.
A dynamic perspective of rise and fall of regional
economies is part of the concept of evolutionary
economic geography, which links ideas of evolu-
tionary processes to economic development
(Amin and Thrift 2000, Martin and Sunley 2001).
The basic idea is rooted in Schumpeter’s concept
of ‘creative destruction’ of economic landscapes
and the fundamental question how changes in these
landscapes occur (Boschma and Martin 2007:
539ff.). Dopfer and Potts (2004: 8ff.) point out that
the basic economic structures like spatial
agglomerations, industrial districts, clusters, cities
etc. are manifestations of rules or knowledge and
that the overall economic landscape is shaped by
changes within the knowledge structure.
The academic literature has a strong focus on
successful regions rather than on failing ones,
because they display a greater capacity for col-
lective action and the ability to learn.
MacKinnon et al. (2009) point out that “[...] such
failure often reflects how inherited routines and
practices [...] can become disadvantageous as
economic circumstances change”. In this view
economic actors become locked in traditional
ways of doing things (Grabher 1993a: 256).
In this view the collapse or sharp decline of whole
economic sectors is not a new phenomenon.
Comparing the financial crisis in developed
countries with those in developing countries,
it could be observed that the recent crisis mani-
fested itself differently according to industrial
sectors. In developed countries, reduced con-
sumption led to pressure in the import-oriented
industries, while developing countries saw a
strong downturn within their export industries.
As Lai (2010: 48) points out, there is a lack of
2011/4            Crisis and Recovery in the Pearl River Delta. The Electronics Industry                395
systematic studies concerning both the causes
and the policy solutions of industry collapse or
decline. He mentions works by Brown (1993),
who documents the collapse of the British toy
industry during the period of 1979-1984,
Marchionatti (1995), who analyses the de-
cline of the British cotton industry in the
1920s, and Boothman (2000), who focuses on
the collapse of the Canadian pulp and paper
industry during the period 1919-1932. The
subjects of these studies are industry collapse
or decline, mainly in developed countries.
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, new
literature has emerged which focuses on indus-
try decline in emerging economies, although
there is still a lack of studies dealing with sharp
decline in export-oriented sectors in emerging
economies in East Asia. Lai (2010) focuses on
the external demand decline which caused the
downturn of the export industry in the Chinese
economy, while Fidrmuc and Korhonen (2010)
analyse the impact of the financial crisis on busi-
ness cycles in Asia’s emerging economies, and
McKay and Song (2010) ask if the impact of
the financial crisis has led to a structural adjust-
ment in the Chinese economy. They conclude
that the crisis is a good opportunity for the
Chinese government to develop new policies
towards a more sustainable development of the
economic sector. Sun (2009) investigated the
resilience of China’s economy to the financial
tsunami and concluded that the financial stimu-
lus from the government and the robust Chinese
domestic market saved the economy from a
severe downturn. While many of these studies
focus on the economy as a whole, there is still
a lack of literature which focuses on specific
geographical regions and how those have been
affected by the recent crisis.
The purpose of this article is to assess the
impact of the global financial crisis and the
resulting economic downturn and recovery in
the PRD. The focus here lies on the electron-
ics sector, which is the most dominant industry
within this region. The aim of this article is,
firstly, to highlight the key reasons for the eco-
nomic decline in the PRD in the last quarter of
2008, secondly, to analyse its immediate
effects, and thirdly, to assess the response and
the recovery of companies in the electronics
sector in 2009. The paper is structured as fol-
lows: The next section presents a literature sur-
vey on the channels through which the effects
of the financial crisis spread to the Chinese
economy. Section 3 presents the survey data,
while Section 4 focuses on empirical data
regarding foreign trade, financial development
and inward investments. The final section pro-
vides a discussion and a conclusion.
2.  Key Reasons for the Economic Downturn
in Emerging Economies
The global financial crisis had its origin in the
bursting of the real estate bubble in North
America, which led to a global banking and credit
crisis. The events on Wall Street in Septem-
ber 2008 spread like shockwaves in developed as
well as in developing economies. Naudé (2010:
213f.) summarises the elements which led to the
financial crisis: easy credit, bad loans, weak
regulation and supervision of complex financial
instruments, debt defaulting, insolvency of key
financial institutions, a loss of credibility and
trust, financial panic and mass selling-off of
stocks, and a hoarding of cash by banks and indi-
viduals. Due to the connectivity of the financial
markets, the crisis spread quickly, creating the
so-called ‘credit crunch’. The effects of the cri-
sis were a sharp decline in consumption, invest-
ments and trade in North America, Europe and
Japan. Although the epicentres of the crisis were
in North America and Europe, the impact of the
financial crisis was severe in emerging econo-
mies. Due to the strong integration into the world
market, growth rates in East Asia slowed down
and export industries faced severe economic
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pressure (Chen and De Lombaerde 2010:
106). Feldstein (2003) gives an overview of
how economic and financial crises spread from
developed countries into emerging economies.
In almost all observed cases in recent decades,
a drop in consumption in the developed coun-
tries led to an economic downturn in emerging
markets all over the world. Weak legal systems,
underdeveloped financial institutions, as well as
fragile domestic markets often result in an even
sharper economic decline.
Little conceptual work has been published on
the effects of the crisis on newly industria-
lising countries. One attempt is Naudé’s
(2009: 4) discussion of three channels of shock
transmission to developing countries, a reduc-
tion of export earnings, a reduction of domestic
lending, and a reduction of foreign financial
flows, which will function as a conceptual basis
for the analysis undertaken in this paper.
Firstly, a reduction in earnings from exports can
cause a massive economic downturn. This effect
can be observed particularly in countries which are
tightly intertwined commercially (Tirole 2002:
12). The economic success of the PRD is linked
to the supply of cheap labour, the export orien-
tation of the companies, the geographical prox-
imity to Hong Kong (HK) and supportive gov-
ernment policies during the last few decades. As
Revilla Diez et al. (2008: 265) point out, the
long-term success of the PRD is due to agile
firm organisation, which consists of both infor-
mality and flexibility. Many HK companies have
relocated their production facilities to the PRD,
while headquarters, R&D, marketing and finance
have all remained in HK. These companies have
adopted well-established ‘low technology’ pro-
duction processes, which were developed else-
where, and have improved the production to gain
competitiveness and market share (Davies
1996: 689). Since 2001, the relocation process
of production to the PRD has accelerated signifi-
cantly. The reasons for this include a stronger in-
tegration of the HK economy with that of main-
land China and an increase in partnerships be-
tween HK businesses and government officials
in the PRD (Meyer 2008: 25). Scholars call this
business model ‘Hong Kong Model’ or ‘front
office, back factory’. In recent years, companies
from Taiwan and from developed countries have
also adopted this business model. Facilities in
the PRD mainly import raw materials, equipment
and core technology, while manufactured goods
are exported (Hürtgen et al. 2009: 123f., Meyer
et al. 2009: 229f., Lai 2010: 58).
The export sector is one key to the economic
success of the PRD. A major share of the over-
all economic growth in China, and especially in
the PRD, is based on the performance of the
export sector. Due to the decline in world trade
in 2009, it is expected that the drop in demand
for consumer goods in North America, Europe
and Japan will result in major pressure on the
export-oriented industry in China (Spence
2009: 504). The International Monetary Fund
(2011) reports that world trade declined by
10.9 per cent in 2009, compared to a 2.8 per cent
growth in 2008. The Chinese economy in 2009
was much more integrated into the global
economy than it had been a decade ago. Spatial
patterns of Chinese exports have changed
significantly during the last two decades,
moving towards a more diversified geographical
distribution. In 1991, almost half of all Chinese
exports were sold to HK, while in 2008, the main
destinations for Chinese exports were the
EU (20.07 per cent), the U.S. (18.39 per cent),
HK (13.59 per cent) and Japan (8.12 per cent)
(Chou et al. 2009: 534). As a region dominated
by export-oriented production and similar trade
patterns, it is expected that the PRD is strongly
affected by a decline in foreign trade.
Secondly, banking failures can lead to a reduction
in domestic lending. Banking failure has direct
implications for the manufacturing sector and for
international trade. In line with Naudé’s (2009)
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arguments, Dell’Ariccia et al. (2008) conclude
that during financial crises, industry sectors which
rely on external finance face lower growth rates
than those sectors which are less dependent on
external finance. The reason for this correlation
is that companies finance their production with
short-term credits. In times of crisis, the overall
capital flow decreases while the uncertainty
increases. This situation results in difficulties for
companies in accessing credits, as almost 90 per
cent of world trade is financed by short-term
credits. In this situation, a ‘credit crunch’ can have
severe implications for the global economy.
In the case of bank lending, there is no such
threat to the Chinese economy, because the fi-
nancial system is largely government-regulated
and foreign banks control only a small market
share. Furthermore, the financial markets in
China are heavily regulated and only a few banks
participated in trade with American sub-prime
mortgages (Naudé 2009: 7). As Sun (2009: 32)
points out, Chinese banks do not need to react
to the crisis by cutting back lending. In fact,
Chinese banks have been gearing up leverage
and pumping much-needed liquidity into the
economy, with bank loans increasing by
34.4 per cent in July 2009 compared to July 2008.
Another source of finance for companies in the
PRD are the stock markets in Shenzhen, HK and
Shanghai. Their indices declined in the aftermath
of the financial crisis, as did all major indices
in East Asia. A drop of more than half their value
in the third and fourth quarter of 2008 could be
observed for both Chinese indices and for the
Hang Seng index in HK. The link between fall-
ing stocks and the financial crisis is limited, as
falling indices have been evident in China since
late 2007 due to an overheating economy
(Shenzhen Stock Exchange 2010).
Thirdly, financial crisis can lead to a reduction of
financial flows from developed to developing
economies. Private investments and remittances
to developing countries declined massively in
2009 by around 300 to 400 billion US dollars.
Remittances and aid flows saw a particularly strong
decline (Naudé 2009: 6). Chen and De Lom-
baerde (2010: 98f.) point out that declining for-
eign investments were one of the main reasons for
the East Asian and Pacific region to feel the im-
pacts of the recent crisis, although the financial
institutions in the region had relatively healthy
positions and their exposure to sub-prime credits
was limited. The financial crisis had a significant
effect on global foreign direct investment (FDI)
flows. After steady growth in the period of 2003-
2007, global FDI inflows fell by 14 per cent to
$ 1,697 billion in 2008 from a record high of
$ 1,979 billion in 2007. In the first half of 2009, FDI
flows fell at an accelerated rate (UNCTAD 2009: 3f.).
In the last two decades, FDI inflow has become
more important for the Chinese economy and  since
1993, inward FDI flows into the Chinese mainland
have grown steadily with the result that the country
surpassed the United States as the world’s largest
FDI recipient in 2001 (Fan et al. 2009: 854).
Whalley and Xin (2010: 134) conclude that the
share of foreign invested enterprises (FIE) in Chi-
na’s economy reached over 20 per cent and contri-
buted over 40 per cent of China’s economic growth
in 2004. Without FDI inflow, the GDP growth rate
for 2004 would have been lower by around 3.4 per-
centage points. The financial crisis had a significant
effect on FDI inflow into the Chinese mainland,
which fell by 20.56 per cent from $27.414 million
in the first quarter of 2008 to $21.777 million in
the first quarter of 2009 (UNCTAD 2009: 51).
Taking into account the theoretical discussion
and the channels of shock transmission, three
hypotheses for the reaction of the economy in
the PRD emerge:
  • Companies with a strong focus on export
markets were affected more by the financial
crisis than companies with a focus on the
Chinese domestic market.
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  • Due to heavy regulation of the financial mar-
ket in China, banking failure and the reduction
in domestic lending did not occur in the PRD.
  • Companies with foreign investments faced
higher pressure than companies without for-
eign investments.
3.  Data and Methods
The data is based on a company survey of
417 companies from the electronics sector in
the PRD, which was conducted between Septem-
ber and November 2009. The focus was on in-
novation and upgrading activities as well as on
the economic situation of the companies in the
eastern part of the PRD (Fig. 1). The question-
naire itself was divided into five main categories:
Market and Strategy, Organisation and Market-
ing, Product and Process Development, Human
Resources and External Contacts. The overall
profile of the companies surveyed is shown
below in Table 1. The company selection was
random and was contacted by phone; while the
questionnaire itself was sent by mail, addressed
to the CEO or management personnel.
The research was funded by a grant from
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG,
German Research Foundation), priority pro-
gramme ‘Megacities – Megachallenges: The
Fig. 1 Shares of sectors in total manufacturing industry in the PRD 2008 (Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2009)
Anteil unterschiedlicher Sektoren am produzierenden Gewerbe im Perlflussdelta 2008
(Guangdong Statistical Yearbook 2009)
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Revenue in 2008 in RMB Number of firms 
Less than 1 Million 30  (7.7 %) 
1 Million ± 10 Million 131  (33.7 %) 
10 Million ± 100 Million 137  (35.2 %) 
100 Million ± 1 Billion 72  (18.5 %) 
More than 1 Billion 19  (4.9 %) 
  
Registration in the PRD Number of firms 
State owned 3 (0.72 %) 
Collectively owned 8 (1.92 %) 
Chinese owned private 244 (58.51 %) 
Wholly foreign owned 123 (29.5 %) 
Chinese foreign equity 32 (7.67 %) 
Chinese foreign cooperative 7 (1.68 %) 
  
Years of experience in the PRD Number of firms 
Mean/maximum/minimum 9,48/56/0 
Regions Number of firms 
 Shenzhen 168 (40.29 %) 
Dongguan 175 (41.97 %) 
Huizhou / Heyuan 74 (17.74 %) 
  
Total employment Number of firms 
Mean/maximum/minimum 738/18.000/4 
Less than 50 employees 69 (16.6 %) 
51-100 employees 59 (14.2 %) 
101-500 employees 177 (42.5 %) 
501-1000 employees 51 (12.3 %) 
1000+ employees 60 (14.4 %) 
  
Share of export in sales Number of firms 
0-25 % 182 (43.5 %) 
25-50 % 76 (18.2 %) 
50-75 % 49 (11.7 %) 
75-100 % 111 (26.6 %) 
Informal Dynamics of Global Change’. The
survey was conducted in cooperation with the
geographical department of the Sun-Yatsen
University in Guangzhou and is part of the
cooperative project ‘Regional Agility and Up-
grading in HK and the PRD’. In addition to the
survey, 36 interviews with experts and com-
panies were carried out in HK and the PRD.
The research focused on the cities of
Shenzhen, Dongguan, Huizhou and Heyuan.
Shenzhen stands, therefore, as the economic
core of the eastern PRD, where the economic
development started very early with the estab-
lishment of the first Chinese special economic
zone in 1978. The development in Dongguan
was ignited mainly by foreign direct investments
from HK and Taiwan years later, while the cit-
ies of Huizhou and Heyuan are good examples
of peripheral development. For a more detailed
overview of the economic development in the
PRD see Veeck et al. (2007: 263ff.) for the
illustration of reforms and challenges in China’s
industrial sector, while Yang (2006) analyses
regional development in global production net-
works in the PRD, and Lu and Wei (2007) ob-
serve domestic globalisation and economic po-
larisation in the Guangdong province.
Tab. 1 Profile of responding firms with N = 417 (own calculation based on survey data)  /  Profil der
teilnehmenden Unternehmen mit N=417 (eigene Berechnungen auf der Grundlage der
Befragungsdaten)
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4.  Impacts and Effects of the
Financial Crisis in the PRD
The economic downturn and the decline in for-
eign trade in the PRD due to lower demand for
consumer goods on international markets and
massive cancellation of orders in the fourth
quarter of 2008 were dramatic. China’s over-
all exports for the first half of 2009 reached the
volume of US$ 521.8 billion, which was
21.7 per cent below the volume of the first half
of 2008. Compared with other major econo-
mies, the decline in exports for China was
rather gentle. The United States faced a decline
 Total trade 
value 
(bn US$) 
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
Export 
value 
(bn US$) 
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
Import 
value 
(bn US$) 
Growth 
rate 
(%) 
20
08
 
July 64.26 17.6 37.09 17.0 27.17 18.6 
August 62.56 10.0 36.96 11.7 25.60 7.7 
September 65.78 12.2 39.11 14.8 26.66 8.5 
October 60.69 7.1 36.80 9.2 23.89 3.9 
November 53.35 -12.2 33.85 -5.1 19.50 -22.2 
December 52.02 -13.6 32.37 -6.8 19.65 -22.9 
20
09
 
January 36.65 -31.0 24.19 -23.6 12.46 -42.0 
February 41.66 -16.9 27.06 -32.7 14.60 -22.1 
March 44.79 -14.3 27.25 -14.3 17.54 -23.7 
April 47.14 -18.1 27.69 -16.1 19.45 -20.9 
May 45.97 -22.1 26.86 -21.2 19,11 -23.4 
June 49.38 -15.0 28.03 -18.0 21.36 -10.8 
July 54.82 -14.7 31.60 -14.8 23.22 -14.5 
August 53.64 -14.7 31.26 -16.2 22.38 -12.6 
September 60.60 -8.3 34.68 -12.0 25.92 -2.8 
October 55.18 -9.4 33.33 -10.0 21.85 -8.5 
November 60.01 12.4 34.71 2.4 25.30 29.7 
December 68.82 32.3 39.97 23.5 28.84 46.7 
20
10
 January 48.86 33.4 28.32 17.0 20.54 65.2 
February 43.67 28.3 24.95 28.5 18.72 28.2 
March 60.64 35.4 32.66 19.8 27.99 59.5 
 
Tab. 2 Foreign trade development in the Guangdong Province (2008-2010) on a monthly year-to-year basis compared
to the year before (Guangdong Provincial Bureau of Statistics 2010)  /  Entwicklung des Außenhandels in der
Provinz Guangdong (2008-2010), jeweils im Vergleich zum selben Monat des Vorjahres
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in exports of 23.8 per cent, South Korea of
22.7 per cent and most of the European econo-
mies of more than 30 per cent (Cai and Chan
2009: 525); emerging economies were hit hard
as well with an even higher decline (Nanto
2009: 5, Liu et al. 2009: 499).
4.1 Foreign trade development in the PRD
The economic situation in the PRD was bleak
and foreign trade figures collapsed by more than
30 per cent on a monthly year-to-year basis, as
shown in Table 2. Foreign trade started to slow
down in October 2008 and turned negative in
November 2008. Negative trade development
continued and growth rates sank to minus
31 per cent in January 2009. An even more dra-
matic development can be observed in import
figures, where growth rates slumped to minus
42 per cent in January 2009. In the first and sec-
ond quarter of 2009, foreign trade in the PRD
reached its lowest point, but two-digit negative
growth rates continued even during the third
quarter of 2009, with rates of minus 15 per cent
during the northern summer months. An eco-
nomic recovery occurred in September and Oc-
tober and growth rates in foreign trade reached
negative single-digit figures. Negative growth
rates on a monthly year-to-year basis plummeted
in the last quarter of 2009 due to the dramatic
decline in 2008, and turned positive in Novem-
ber 2009. Growth rates have risen dramatically
since November 2009 with figures for foreign
trade of more than 30 per cent. Imports grew even
more, with an increase of over 60 per cent in Janu-
ary 2010. These are astonishing figures, but one
must keep in mind that import figures in the first
quarter of 2009 were at a very low level.
The development of foreign trade during the fi-
nancial crisis shows that imports can be an early
indicator for the further development of exports.
Chen and De Lombaerde (2010: 94) estimate
that roughly 50 to 60 per cent of China’s exports
to the U.S. would be at risk if important compo-
nents and core technology could not be imported.
This connection occurred in the PRD in the last
quarter of 2009, when imports increased sub-
stantially while exports followed a month later.
However, making a final judgement about this in-
terdependency and formulating a better projec-
tion of short-term trade development in the
PRD extends beyond the scope of this article,
and thus requires further research.
4.2 Decline in trade and export earnings
Declining foreign trade has strong implica-
tions for the PRD, because many companies
produce for international markets. The data
collected show that the average shares of ex-
ports account for 42.86 per cent of sales,
while 56.98 per cent of sales are generated in
the Chinese domestic market. The most impor-
tant export markets for the companies in the
PRD are HK (8.21 per cent) and Taiwan
(7.7 per cent). Other international export
destinations account for 27.1 per cent.
Due to impressive foreign trade expansion in the
Chinese economy over the last few years, growth
rates of the firms surveyed in the PRD have been
very high recently. Average growth rates in sales
were at an astonishing level of 27.57 per cent
(standard deviation [s.d.] 33.851) in 2007 and re-
mained high in the first half of 2009 even after a
fall to 21.51 per cent (s.d. 45.099). Despite the
economic downturn in global markets, the per-
formance of companies in the PRD in the first
half of 2009 was very impressive. In a few cases,
growth rates of more than 200 per cent occurred
due to massive orders by the Chinese govern-
ment. The average growth rates for net profit in
2007 were at 17.79 per cent (s.d. 26.511), even
reaching 13.13 per cent in the first half of 2009
(s.d. 30.121). The high standard deviation for the
2009 figures suggests that the variation of growth
rates was much greater than in 2007.
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As a response to falling growth rates in sales and
net profit, a reduction of 7.3 per cent occurred in
the average total workforce. In total employee
numbers, the average workforce per company
dropped from 796.9 to 737.8. Following the
sharp decline of the economy in the PRD in the
fourth quarter of 2008, as reported in early 2009
(Business Week 2009, Bradsher 2009), the re-
gion entered a phase of strong recovery in the
first half of 2009, as shown in Figure 2. Growth
rates rose in this time, but the overall economic
level was still lower than in 2007 and 2008.
For a further analysis, the sample was divided into
two reference groups in order to get a more de-
tailed understanding of growth rates in sales, net
profit and workforce development for export-
oriented and domestic-market oriented compa-
nies. As shown in Table 3, growth rates in the first
half of 2009 were lower than in 2007 for both
groups of companies. Companies with an export
orientation were better off in terms of growth
rates in sales and net profit than domestic-market
oriented companies. This finding is congruent for
2007 as well as for the first half of 2009. In terms
Pre-crisis 
Recovery 
2007 2009 
E
co
no
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
Time
Fig. 2 Schematic overview of growth de-
velopment in the PRD (authors’ own
figure)  /  Schematische Darstel-
lung der Entwicklung im Perl-
flussdelta (eigene Darstellung)
Tab. 3 Comparison of growth rates in sales, net profit and average total workforce in companies which
produce for the domestic market and companies with a high share of exports x in 2007 and 2009
(own calculation based on survey data)  /  Vergleich der Wachstumsraten für Umsatz, Gewinn und
Beschäftigung in Unternehmen mit hohem sowie niedrigem Exportanteil x in den Jahren 2007
und 2009 (eigene Berechnungen auf der Grundlage der Befragungsdaten)
 
N 
x < 50% 
(257) 
x > 50% 
(157) 
Sig. (2-tail) 
- 
20
07
 Growth rate: sales 27.05 28.33 .748 
Growth rate: net profit 17.53 18.17 .838 
Total workforce 489.41 1223.6 .001 
20
09
 Growth rate: sales 19.84 24.41 .407 
Growth rate: net profit 10.98 16.98 .141 
Total workforce 485.1 1111.73 .001 
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of workforce, a structural difference between
these two groups could be observed.
Export-oriented companies in the PRD employ
more than double the number of workers em-
ployed by domestic-market oriented compa-
nies. In comparison, workforce development
was different. While export-oriented compa-
nies reduced their workforce sharply from an
average of 1223.6 employees in 2007 to
1111.73 in the first half of 2009 (Sig. [2-tail]:
0.156), domestic-market oriented companies
maintained their workforce.
4.3 Banking failure and
a reduction of domestic lending
Companies in the PRD access a broad array of
financial sources. By far the most important are
family members or friends, which account for an
average of 42.63 per cent of all financial sources.
Chinese banks also play a significant role, con-
tributing an average share of 29.66 per cent of
overall finance in the PRD. Further financial
sources include parent or affiliate companies
(13.03 per cent), HK banks (9.98 per cent), for-
eign banks (3.46 per cent) and the stock market
in Shenzhen (1.86 per cent). Despite the fact that
most of the major international banks have an
operation in China, they are still of lesser im-
portance as a financial source for companies. The
data collected show that for most companies
finance from HK and foreign banks in particu-
lar is not easily accessible. When asked how
accessible financial sources are in the PRD, the
response tended to be that family members and
friends as a source of finance are very easy to
access. On a five step scale (with 0 as not acces-
sible and 5 as very easily accessible), the aver-
age figure for family members and friends is
2.61, followed by Chinese banks (1.75),
HK banks (0.91), affiliate companies or busi-
ness partners (0.90), foreign banks (0.42) and
the stock market (0.42). These figures are in line
with the distribution of average financial sources
above. Foreign banks, including HK banks, are
difficult to access and therefore play a minor
role in company finance in the PRD.
This picture changes when put into the perspec-
tive of export orientation as shown in Table 4.
The contribution of foreign banks to company
finance increases along with the share of ex-
ports as a proportion of total sales. For compa-
nies with an export share of less than 25 per cent,
Share of export in sales (%) 
(N) 
0 - 25 
(142) 
25 - 50 
(61) 
50 - 75 
(42) 
75 - 100 
(90) 
Sig. (2-tail) 
- 
Chinese bank 33.40 31.80 35.24 18.41 .009 
Foreign banks (incl. HK Banks) 5.11 10.93 18.21 26.18 .000 
Stock market 1.40 1.64 5.36 1.11 .031 
Parent/affiliate company 9.44 11.15 13.45 19.70 .082 
Family members/friends 50.65 44.48 27.74 35.57 .008 
Total 100 100 100 100 - 
 
Tab. 4 Sources of finance according to export share, in per cent (own calculation based on survey data)
Finanzquellen gegliedert nach Exportanteil in Prozent (eigene Berechnungen auf der Grundlage
der Befragungsdaten)
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foreign banks (including HK banks) contribute
an average of 5.11 per cent of overall finance,
while for companies with a 50 to 75 per cent
share of exports, the contribution increases to
18.21 per cent. Companies with an export share
of more than 75 per cent rely even more
heavily on finance from foreign banks, with the
average share increasing to 26.18 per cent. At
the same time, the importance of family
members and friends as a source of finance
decreases significantly.
As it turns out, the stock market as a financial
source is not accessible for many companies.
The system of going public in China is biased
towards successful state-owned enterprises
(SOE), and regional governments select better-
quality SOEs because they have a natural ad-
vantage of information acquisition over pri-
vate enterprises. This government-controlled
system is in place because it ensures a smooth
development of the Chinese financial market.
In the long run, this system is not effective,
and Du and Xu (2009: 823) argue that there
is a need for strengthening the market mecha-
nism. The stock market contributes only a
minor share of company finance, and even
companies with high exports do not rely on the
stock market as a source of finance.
In line with the analyses above, the sample was
divided into two groups. The first group has an
average share of foreign bank investment (includ-
ing HK banks) which is below 25 per cent, while
the second group has a share above 25 per cent.
As shown in Table 5, companies in both groups
had a lower growth rate in sales and net profit in
the first half of 2009 than in 2007. Companies
with a high share of foreign bank finance had a
better performance in sales and net profit in
2007 and in the first half of 2009 than compa-
nies with a low share of finance from foreign
banks. Similar structural differences became
apparent between these two groups as between
export-oriented and domestic-market oriented
companies. Companies with a high share of fi-
nance from foreign banks had a significantly
larger workforce than companies with a low
share of finance from foreign banks. Total
workforce figures declined for both groups, but
the decline in workforce was only significant in
companies with a high share of finance from
foreign banks (Sig. [2-tail]: 0.074).
Tab. 5 Comparison of growth rates in sales, net profit and average total workforce in companies with a below and an
above average share of finance from foreign banks (incl. HK banks) in 2007 and 2009 (own calculation based
on survey data) / Vergleich der Wachstumsraten für Umsatz, Gewinn und Beschäftigung in Unternehmen
mit hohem sowie niedrigem Finanzierungsanteil von ausländischen Banken (inkl. HK-Banken) in den
Jahren 2007 und 2009 (eigene Berechnungen auf der Grundlage der Befragungsdaten)
 
N 
x < 25% 
(260) 
x > 25% 
(76) 
Sig. (2-tail) 
- 
20
07
 Sales 24.91 30.99 .320 
Net profit 16.42 18.09 .592 
Total workforce 605.74 1322.2 .052 
20
09
 Sales 19.28 26.01 .377 
Net profit 11.73 14.63 .421 
Total workforce 587.38 1131.8 .061 
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4.4 Reduction of financial flows
Foreign direct investments have become very im-
portant in the PRD in recent years. 38.9 per cent
of the companies observed have a foreign inves-
tor, while 61.1 per cent are Chinese-owned. More
than half (58.5 per cent) of the companies in the
PRD are private Chinese-owned companies. Chi-
nese state-owned (0.7 per cent) and Chinese
collectively owned companies (1.9 per cent)
are uncommon in the electronics sector of the
PRD. The most common company registration
with a foreign investor is wholly foreign-owned
(29.5 per cent), while equity-owned joint ven-
tures of Chinese and foreign investors account
for 7.7 per cent and Chinese-foreign coopera-
tives for 1.7 per cent. This ownership structure
in the PRD reflects the strong contribution of
foreign investments in recent years.
The figures for foreign investments in the PRD
are higher than is reflected in the company re-
gistration. More than 44 per cent of all compa-
nies observed have foreign investments, while
55.5 per cent do not. The most important sources
of foreign investments are based in Taiwan and
HK due to good relations, a similar cultural heri-
tage and language. Investments from Taiwan are a
financial source in 37.1 per cent of all companies
with foreign investment, followed by HK, which
accounts for 34.41 per cent. Investments from
Asia (15.05 per cent), the U.S. (7.53 per cent) and
Europe (5.91 per cent) are lower than those from
Taiwan and HK, and play only a minor role.
When companies with no foreign investment are
compared to those with foreign investment, it can
be observed that growth rates in sales and net profit
in the first half of 2009 were lower than in 2007,
as shown in Table 6. In companies without foreign
investment, the growth rate in sales declined from
27.14 per cent in 2007 to 18.19 per cent in the
first half of 2009, while growth rates in compa-
nies with foreign investment dropped from
22.81 per cent to 20.95 per cent. Net profit devel-
opment declined in companies without foreign in-
vestment from 22.81 per cent in 2007 to
11.41 per cent in the first half of 2009, while in
companies with foreign investment, growth rates
increased slightly from 16.05 per cent to 16.68 per
cent in the first half of 2009. Total workforce
numbers declined in both groups, but companies
with a foreign investment experienced a signi-
ficant drop (Sig. [2-tail]: 0.045).
Tab. 6 Comparison of growth rates in sales, net profit and average total workforce in companies with or without
foreign investment in 2007 und 2009 (own calculation based on survey data)  /  Vergleich der Wachstumsraten
für Umsatz, Gewinn und Beschäftigung in Unternehmen mit und ohne ausländischen Investitionen
in den Jahren 2007 und 2009 (eigene Berechnungen auf der Grundlage der Befragungsdaten)
 
 
N 
No foreign 
investment 
(232) 
With foreign 
Investment 
(186) 
Sig.  
(2-tail) 
- 
20
07
 Sales 27.14 22.81 .204 
Net profit 22.81 16.05 .889 
Total work force 634.96 1391.84 .017 
20
09
 Sales 18.19 20.95 .608 
Net profit 11.41 16.68 .223 
Total workforce 620.24 1301.26 .011 
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5.  Discussion and Conclusion
The economic downturn in the PRD was severe
in the fourth quarter of 2008 due to declining for-
eign trade and the overall weakness of the global
economy in the months after the financial crisis.
In the first half of 2009, the economy in the PRD
entered a phase of recovery. The conceptual back-
ground of this paper was Naudé’s (2009) argu-
ment of shock transmission from developed to
developing countries. In the case of the PRD, the
following results were obtained: Firstly, it was
found that growth rates in sales and net profit in
the first half of 2009 were significantly lower
than in 2007 for all companies, however the over-
all economic performance was lower than a year
before. Secondly, companies with a high reliance
on exports usually enjoy higher growth rates than
companies with a strong focus on the Chinese
domestic market. Thirdly, a structural difference
between these two company groups could be ob-
served: Export-oriented companies employ more
than double the number of workers of companies
with an orientation towards the Chinese domes-
tic market. The final observation was that only
companies with a focus on exports, foreign banks’
loans or foreign capital experienced a significant
decline in total workforce numbers, while com-
panies oriented towards the domestic market kept
their workforce on a similar level to that of 2007.
Thus, the channels for the transmission of the
crisis exist as hypothesised by Naudé (2009).
However, they mainly affect companies with a
marked international orientation, which responded
by reducing their workforce, while keeping high
growth rates in sales and net profit.
The findings of this paper are in line with the
arguments of Schüller and Schüler-Zhou
(2009: 176) who asserted that the financial
crisis had only a minor effect on the Chinese
economy, as strong government intervention
prevented a lasting recession. In 2007, invest-
ment, consumption and exports accounted for
4.3, 4.4 and 2.7 per cent of GDP growth respec-
tively, while in the first half of 2009, this com-
position was much less balanced. Investment –
mostly allocated by the Chinese government in
the form of the financial stimulus package – and
consumption accounted for 6.2 and 3.8 per cent
respectively. Exports accounted negatively for
2.9 per cent. Despite the impressive recovery of
the Chinese economy, Overholt (2010: 30) ex-
pects that “[...] there will be a hangover of bad
loans in China as a result of the hasty approval
of numerous projects that would never have
passed reviews before the stimulus.”
The local government’s top priority in the PRD
is a development towards more industrial up-
grading and innovation as stated in the ‘Outline
of the Plan for the Reform and Development of
the PRD (2008-2020)’ released by the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC).
This development had already started before the
financial crisis in early 2008, but efforts accel-
erated in 2009 and heavy investments were made
by the local government. Another explanation
for the minimal influence of falling foreign trade
on company performance in China is formulated
by Sun (2009: 40) who argues that the fall of
growth rates in China from the beginning of the
financial crisis onwards was caused not by fall-
ing exports, but by massive destocking. Once
destocking was finished, domestic demand con-
tinued, with an increase in industrial production
occurring in the second half of 2009 and the first
quarter of 2010. Further research must clarify
the contribution of the Chinese government in
stabilising and fostering economic growth in the
PRD. The question remains as to the way in
which heavy involvement and regulation by the
government can protect a regional economy in
developing countries from the effects of a finan-
cial crisis in developed countries. More research
has to be conducted to find out whether these re-
sults are transferable to other developing coun-
tries in East Asia and if the financial crises
strengthened the evolution and agility of the
electronics sector in the PRD.
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Summary: Crisis and Recovery in the Pearl River
Delta. Growth and Employment in the Electronics
Industry
Compared with most other regions and industries in
China, the electronics industry in the Pearl River
Delta (PRD) has been hit hard by the current eco-
nomic crisis. Numerous companies have ceased
operations and thousands of workers have been laid
off. The orientation of the electronics industry to-
wards exporting low-cost products has proven to be
a point of weakness in this ongoing crisis. The aims
of this article are threefold: firstly, to highlight the
key reasons for the crisis and the Pearl River Delta’s
susceptibility to it; secondly, to analyse the channels
through which the global crisis affected the PRD,
and thirdly, to analyse the immediate effects on
companies. All analyses are based on firm-level data
acquired in 2009 with support from DFG SPP 1233.
They show that the crisis has mainly affected the
internationally oriented companies in the PRD. The
results reveal structural differences between com-
panies in the export sector and those focusing on the
Chinese domestic market. Companies with a high
export share employ double the size of workers than
companies with a low share. The analysis discov-
ered a significant decline of total workforce in
companies in the export sector in the period from
2007 to 2009. Companies with a focus on the Chi-
nese domestic market maintained their workforce at
an unchanged level. Differences can also be ob-
served in growth rates for sales and net profit.
Companies in the export sector had slightly higher
growth rates in sales and net profit before the crisis
in 2007 and during the first half of 2009.
Zusammenfassung: Krise und Erholung im
Perlflussdelta. Wachstum und Beschäftigung in
der Elektronikindustrie
Im Vergleich zu ähnlich strukturierten Regionen
und Industrien war die Elektronikindustrie im Perl-
flussdelta (China) den Folgen der globalen Finanz-
krise in China am stärksten ausgesetzt. Eine Viel-
zahl von Unternehmen musste infolge der Krise den
Betrieb einstellen und Tausende von Arbeitnehmern
entlassen. Die Ausrichtung der Elektronikindustrie
im Perlflussdelta bezüglich einer exportorientierten
Strategie stellte sich in der gegenwärtigen Krise als
möglicher Schwachpunkt für die gesamte Region
heraus. Dieser Artikel verfolgt drei Zielsetzungen:
erstens die Hauptgründe für die Anfälligkeit der
Elektronikindustrie im Perlflussdelta aufzuzeigen,
zweitens die direkten Auswirkungen der aktuellen
Krise auf die Unternehmensperformance und die
Entwicklung der Beschäftigung zu analysieren und
drittens die Reaktionen der Unternehmen zu diskutie-
ren. Der Schwerpunkt liegt hierbei auf Anstrengun-
gen auf Unternehmensseite, die Anfälligkeit des Ge-
schäftsmodells zu minimieren. Alle Analysen basie-
ren auf Unternehmensdaten, die im Rahmen des
DFG-Schwerpunktprogrammes 1233 im zweiten
Halbjahr 2009 aufgenommen wurden. Die Ergebnis-
se zeigen, dass strukturelle Unterschiede zwischen
Unternehmen mit hohem und geringem Exportanteil
im Perlflussdelta auftreten. Exportorientierte Unter-
nehmen beschäftigen doppelt so viele Arbeitnehmer
wie Unternehmen mit niedrigem Exportanteil. Zudem
fand eine signifikante Reduzierung der Beschäftigten
in Unternehmen des Exportsektors zwischen 2007
und 2009 statt. Eine vergleichbare Entwicklung ist bei
Unternehmen, die einen hohen Anteil des Umsatzes
auf dem chinesischen Markt generieren, nicht zu
beobachten. Unterschiede sind auch bei Wachstums-
raten im Umsatz und beim Gewinn festzustellen.
Unternehmen mit hohem Exportanteil wiesen sowohl
vor der Krise als auch in der ersten Jahreshälfte 2009
höhere Wachstumsraten auf.
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Résumé: Crise et régénération dans le Pearl River
Delta (PRD). Croissance et emploi dans l’industrie
électronique
Comparé avec autres régions et industries avec une
structure similaire, l’industrie électronique dans le
Pearl River Delta (PRD) en Chine a été touché le
plus durement par la crise économique actuelle. De
nombreuses entreprises ont cessé leurs activités et
des milliers de travailleurs ont été licenciés. L’orien-
tation de l’industrie de l’électronique vers l’expor-
tation de produits à faible coût s’est avéré être un
point de faiblesse dans cette crise. Les objectifs de
cet article sont triple: d’une part, de mettre en
évidence les principales raisons de la susceptibilité
de la Pearl River Delta à la crise economique mon-
diale, d’autre part, d’analyser les effets directs de
la crise sur les activités des entreprises et l’emploi,
et, troisièmement, d’exposer les réactions des en-
treprises. Toutes les analyses sont fondées sur des
données au niveau des entreprises acquises en 2009
avec le soutien de la projet de rechèrche DFG SPP
1233. Les résultats montrent des différences struc-
turelles entre les entreprises orientés vers l’expor-
tation et celles qui se concentrent sur le marché
intérieur chinois. En moyenne, le nombre d’em-
ployées dans les entreprises avec une grande por-
tion d’exportation est double le nombre dans des
compagnies avec une proportion faible. L’analyse a
découvert une baisse significative de l’effectif total
dans les entreprises du secteur des exportations
dans la période allant de 2007 à 2009. Les entrepri-
ses avec un accent sur le marché intérieur chinois
ont maintenu leurs effectifs à un niveau inchangé.
Des différences peuvent également être observées
dans les taux de croissance des ventes et du bénéfice
net. Les entreprises du secteur de l’exportation ont
enregistré des taux de croissance légèrement supé-
rieur au chiffre d’affaires et le bénéfice net avant la
crise en 2007 et pendant la première moitié de 2009.
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